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IMBOP-GD – A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR BUILDING THE PSYCHOSOCIAL RESILIENCE OF STANDBY GROUPS IN THE FACE OF HYBRID THREATS

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Introduction

In the face of growing hybrid threats and digital transformation, existing models for building psychosocial resilience within the uniformed services are showing significant limitations.[1] Particularly evident is the lack of a conceptual framework that would allow for the simultaneous strengthening of individual competencies, the transformation of organisational culture and the development of resilience in the socio-digital dimension. The modern officer does not experience threats as separate phenomena, but as an inseparable interplay of individual, institutional and digital influences.[2]

This article presents a proposal for the authors' own IMBOP-GD model (Interdisciplinary Model for Building Psychosocial Resilience in On-Call Groups), which aims to bridge this gap. The model is both descriptive and practical in nature – it not only describes the mechanisms of resilience but also provides specific guidance on designing systemic interventions within the uniformed services.

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[1] I. T. Adams, S. H. Mastracci, 'Police Body-Worn Cameras: Effects on Officers' Burnout and Perceived Organizational Support', *Police Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2019, pp. 5–30.

[2] J. Gierszewski, I. Osmólska (eds.), *Dobrostan w grupach dyspozycyjnych: Ujęcie współczesne i historyczne,* Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pomorskiego, Słupsk 2023.

Methodology for constructing the model

The IMBOP-GD model was developed as a result of a critical synthesis of the literature in the fields of positive psychology, the sociology of dispositional groups, security studies and social communication. The process of constructing the model took place in several stages. In the first stage, a review was conducted of existing models of psychosocial resilience (including the PERMA model[3], the JD-R model by Bakker and Demerouti[4], and the CSF2 programme[5]) and their limitations were identified in the context of hybrid threats. In the second stage, an analysis was carried out of new stressors arising from digital transformation and information warfare.[6] In the third stage, selected theoretical concepts were integrated into a coherent three-dimensional model, taking into account both risk factors and protective resources at each level. In the fourth stage, operationalisation indicators were developed to enable empirical verification of the model. The model's design was also based on consultations with experts – psychologists from the uniformed services and officers responsible for training – which allowed the proposed solutions to be adapted to institutional realities.

Theoretical assumptions of the IMBOP-GD model

The IMBOP-GD model is based on several key theoretical assumptions, drawing on the body of work in positive psychology, the sociology of dispositional groups and security studies.[7]

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[3] M. E. P. Seligman, *Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being,* Free Press, New York 2011.

[4] A. B. Bakker, E. Demerouti, 'Job Demands–Resources Theory: Taking Stock and Looking Forward', *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, vol. 22, no. 3, 2017, pp. 273–285.

[5] R. Cornum, M. D. Matthews, M. E. P. Seligman, 'Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: Building Resilience in a Challenging Institutional Context', *American Psychologist*, vol. 66, no. 1, 2011, pp. 4–9.

[6] S. van der Linden, J. Roozenbeek, J. Compton, 'Inoculating Against Fake News About COVID-19', *Frontiers in Psychology,* vol. 11, 2020, article 566790; R. Chesney, D. K. Citron, 'Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 98, no. 1, 2019, pp. 147–155.

[7] M. E. P. Seligman, 'Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being', *Free Press*, New York 2011; A. B. Bakker, E. Demerouti, op. cit. ; J. Maciejewski, *Grupy dyspozycyjne społeczeństwa polskiego*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2011.

Firstly, the model assumes that psychosocial resilience in the era of hybrid threats is neither a static characteristic of an individual nor solely the result of organisational actions, but rather a dynamic, multi-level process requiring simultaneous intervention at the individual, organisational and socio-digital levels. Resilience is understood here as the capacity of a system (an individual, an organisation, a community) to maintain its integrity, effectiveness and well-being under conditions of chronic pressure, whilst retaining the ability to adapt and learn.[8]

Secondly, the model adopts a salutogenic perspective, focusing not only on eliminating risk factors, but above all on strengthening protective resources.[9] In contrast to the pathogenic approach, which focuses on deficits and pathologies, the salutogenic perspective emphasises factors that promote health and well-being.

Thirdly, the model assumes that the three dimensions are in constant interaction with one another – changes in one dimension affect the others, which requires an integrated, rather than a fragmented, approach to intervention.[10] The model is also based on Hobfoll's resource-protection theory, according to which people strive to accumulate and protect valuable resources (material, social and psychological), and the loss of these resources leads to stress.

The model also assumes that, in the context of hybrid threats, the traditional distinction between „internal" and „external" stressors is becoming increasingly less useful. A disinformation attack or an image-building campaign on social media may originate from outside (a hostile actor), be amplified by internal factors (organisational culture, lack of procedures) and affect both the individual and the institution as a whole. A systemic approach that takes these interconnections into account is therefore essential.

The choice of three dimensions for the model stems from a review of the literature, which identifies three main levels at which hybrid threats operate: the individual level (psychological), the institutional level (organisational) and the societal level (relational and communicative). These dimensions are

[8] S. E. Hobfoll, 'Social and Psychological Resources and Adaptation', *Review of General Psychology,* vol. 6, no. 4, 2002, pp. 307–324.

[9] S. S. Luthar, D. Cicchetti, B. Becker, 'The Construct of Resilience: A Critical Evaluation and Guidelines for Future Work', *Child Development,* vol. 71, no. 3, 2000, pp. 543–562; A. Antonovsky, *Unraveling the Mysteries of Health: How People Manage Stress and Stay Well*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 1987.

[10] N. Ogińska-Bulik, *Pozytywne skutki doświadczeń traumatycznych*, Difin, Warszawa 2013.

closely interlinked and mutually dependent, which justifies their joint analysis. The omission of other dimensions (e.g. political or economic) stems from the adopted psychosocial perspective, which focuses on the well-being of officers and the internal mechanisms of the force's functioning, rather than on state security policy in the broad sense.

The three dimensions of the IMBOP-GD model

The individual dimension covers the development of an officer's cognitive, emotional and behavioural competencies. Within the framework of cognitive competencies, the model places particular emphasis on resilience to disinformation and cognitive warfare. This includes the ability to critically analyse sources of information, recognise manipulation techniques (including deepfakes and synthetic media), managing cognitive uncertainty in the context of an infodemic, and maintaining the stability of decision-making processes under informational pressure.[11] In practice, this means, amongst other things, the ability to verify information, recognise emotional persuasion techniques, and be aware of one's own cognitive biases, which may be exploited by actors conducting hybrid operations.

Emotional competences focus on regulating emotions in situations of chronic image-related pressure and online hate, building resilience to social stigmatisation, and maintaining a sense of purpose in one's work despite disinformation campaigns.[12] It is particularly important here to develop the ability to cope with emotions such as anger, helplessness and anxiety, which often arise as a result of attacks on one's reputation. Behavioural competences include digital hygiene (mindful management of one's social media presence), strategies for dealing with online verbal aggression, and building personal support networks in the digital environment.[13]

The organisational dimension focuses on transforming the culture and institutional structures of the uniformed services. A key element is changing the organisational culture towards normalising the seeking of psychological

[11] S. van der Linden, J. Roozenbeek, J. Compton, op. cit.; G. S. Jowett, V. O'Donnell, 'Propaganda and Persuasion', 7th ed., *SAGE Publications*, 2019.

[12] N. Ogińska-Bulik, *Pozytywne skutki doświadczeń traumatycznych*, Difin, Warszawa 2013; D. Paton, J. M. Violanti (eds.), *Traumatic Stress in Police Officers: A Career-Length Assessment from Recruitment to Retirement*, Charles C Thomas Publisher, Springfield 200

[13] D. Derks, A. B. Bakker, Smartphone Use, 'Work–Home Interference, and Burnout: A Diary Study', *Applied Psychology*, vol. 63, no. 3, 2014, pp. 411–440.

support and speaking openly about psychological strain.[14] In many units, an ethos of „toughness" still prevails, which makes officers reluctant to report mental health issues for fear of stigmatisation or negative career consequences. The model envisages the development of transformational leadership, which not only motivates subordinates but also actively supports them in coping with the pressures of media scrutiny and public perception.[15] Transformational leadership is based on four components: idealised influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and the individualised treatment of subordinates.

At a structural level, the model provides for the development of coherent digital policies, including procedures for responding to disinformation and reputation-damaging attacks, mechanisms for providing rapid support to victims of cyberbullying, and systems for monitoring the psychological strain on officers in the context of hybrid threats.[16] Another key element is the integration of information and digital skills into basic training and professional development programmes. Currently, in most uniformed services, training in strategic communication and resilience to disinformation is either non-existent or occurs only sporadically. The model calls for this to become a permanent feature of the training process.

The socio-digital dimension is the most innovative component of the model. It develops the concept of socio-digital resilience, understood as the ability of an officer and the entire force to maintain psychological integrity and professional effectiveness under conditions of constant informational and technological pressure.[17] Within this dimension, the model encompasses mechanisms for rebuilding public trust eroded by disinformation campaigns, strategies for strategic communication with the media and the public in the digital age, as well as building the resilience of the entire local community against hybrid operations targeting the uniformed services.

[14] J. Maciejewski, op. cit. ; J. Maciejewski, *Socjologia grup dyspozycyjnych: wprowadzenie*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2012.

[15] R. Cornum, M. D. Matthews, M. E. P. Seligman, 'Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: Building Resilience in a Challenging Institutional Context', *American Psychologist*, vol. 66, no. 1, 2011, pp. 4–9; M. E. P. Seligman, *Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Free Press, New York 2011.

[16] J. Gierszewski, I. Osmólska (eds.), *Dobrostan w grupach dyspozycyjnych: Ujęcie współczesne i historyczne*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pomorskiego, Słupsk 2023.

[17] I. T. Adams, S. H. Mastracci, op. cit.; D. Paton, J. M. Violanti (eds.), op. cit..

A particularly important aspect of this dimension is taking into account the relationship between officers and their families. Disinformation attacks and smear campaigns often affect not only the officer themselves, but also their loved ones – their children at school, their spouse at work, or their parents in the local community. The IMBOP-GD model therefore assumes that support should also extend to officers' families, which is currently rare in support systems for uniformed services. In this context, it is worth referring to the research by Twenge i Campbell[18] and Bernburg et al.[19], which points to rising levels of technophobia and its impact on family relationships in high-risk professions.

Interactions between dimensions

The IMBOP-GD model assumes that the three dimensions are in constant, dynamic interaction with one another. For example, the development of cognitive competences at the individual level (resilience to disinformation) is significantly more effective when supported by appropriate organisational policies (the organisational dimension) and when the organisation as a whole has strategies for crisis communication in the digital sphere (the socio-digital dimension). Similarly, a shift in organisational culture towards greater openness regarding mental health issues will be more sustainable if it is accompanied by individual programmes to develop officers' emotional competences and measures to rebuild public trust.[20]

These interactions are two-way. On the one hand, a strong individual dimension (officers' high cognitive resilience) may reduce the pressure on the organisational dimension (fewer incidents requiring systemic intervention). On the other hand, a well-functioning organisational dimension (clear procedures and institutional support) can strengthen the individual dimension, giving officers a sense that they are not alone in facing hybrid attacks. Research by Reivich, Seligman and McBride (2011) and Cornum et al. (2011) confirm

[18] J. M. Twenge, W. K. Campbell, 'Digital Media Use Is Linked to Lower Psychological Well-Being: Evidence from Three Datasets', *Psychiatric Quarterly,* vol. 90, no. 2, 2019, pp. 311–331.

[19] M. Bernburg, A. Tell, D. A. Groneberg, S. Mache, 'Digital Stressors and Resources Perceived by Emergency Physicians and Associations to Their Digital Stress Perception, Mental Health, Job Satisfaction and Work Engagement', *BMC Emergency Medicine*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2024, Article 31.

[20] J. Maciejewski, K. Dojwa-Turczyńska (eds.), *Dobrostan w grupach dyspozycyjnych*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2022.

that resilience-building programmes are most effective when supported by appropriate organisational policies and institutional culture.

Rationale for integrating the dimensions

A modern hybrid attack (e.g. a coordinated disinformation campaign using deepfakes and bots) simultaneously affects the individual (a decline in morale, a sense of helplessness, a diminished sense of purpose in service), institutions (reputational crisis, internal destabilisation, reduced operational effectiveness) and the public sphere (erosion of public trust, polarisation, delegitimisation of state institutions). Therefore, effective intervention cannot be limited to a single dimension.[21]

The IMBOP-GD model posits that only the simultaneous strengthening of all three pillars enables comprehensive protection of officers' welfare and the maintenance of the force's operational effectiveness in conditions of a permanent hybrid threat.[22] A piecemeal approach, consisting, for example, solely of individual training without changing the organisational culture and without a public communication strategy, is bound to have limited effectiveness. The US Army's experience with the CSF2 programme shows that systemic interventions, combining individual training with institutional changes, yield significantly better results than measures taken at a single level alone[23].

Examples of the model's practical application

The IMBOP-GD model can be applied in various crisis situations. Firstly, as a response to a disinformation campaign targeting a particular organisation. When a coordinated disinformation campaign appears on social media, aimed at discrediting a particular organisation, a systematic response should include: (1) at the individual level – immediate psychological support for officers affected by the attacks, and training on how to deal with online hate speech; (2) at the organisational level – the activation of crisis procedures, the preparation of official statements, and legal support for those affected; (3) at the socio-digital level – active communication with the media, monitoring and countering disinformation, and building a narrative that strengthens public trust.

[21] J. Gierszewski, I. Osmólska (eds.), op. cit.

[22] D. Paton, J. M. Violanti (eds.), op.cit.

[23] R. Cornum, M. D. Matthews, M. E. P. Seligman, op. cit.

Secondly, the implementation of a training programme on resilience to disinformation. The programme should be delivered at three levels: (1) individual – workshops developing critical thinking, the ability to verify sources, and techniques for regulating emotions; (2) organisational – incorporating the subject matter into basic training and professional development programmes, and training instructors; (3) socio-digital – information campaigns aimed at officers' families and local communities, and cooperation with the media on countering disinformation.

Thirdly, as a transformation of organisational culture towards normalising the act of seeking help. Measures should include: (1) at the individual level – psychoeducational programmes for officers, training in stress management; (2) at the organisational level – changes to procedures for reporting mental health issues, training for management in recognising symptoms of mental overload, and the introduction of peer support systems; (3) at the social and digital level – information campaigns aimed at families and local communities, and building a narrative around the strength that comes from looking after one's mental health.

In order for the IMBOP-GD model to be effectively implemented and evaluated, it is necessary to develop indicators for each of the dimensions.

In the individual dimension, these will be:

1. Resilience to disinformation – adaptation of the Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory[24] and a scale for assessing the reliability of information sources (to be developed).
2. Sense of purpose in service – adaptation of the Sense of Life Scale[25] to a professional context.
3. Fear of reputational attacks – an original scale to be developed based on the concept of social and technological anxiety.
4. Digital hygiene – adaptation of the Digital Stress Scale[26] and an original scale for managing one's social media presence.

[24] P. A. Facione, N. C. Facione, *The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI)*, California Academic Press, California 1992.

[25] M. F. Steger, P. Frazier, S. Oishi, M. Kaler, 'The Meaning in Life Questionnaire: Assessing the Presence of and Search for Meaning in Life', *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, vol. 53, no. 1, 2006, pp. 80–93.

[26] J. A. Hall, R. G. Steele, J. L. Christofferson, T. Mihailova, 'Development and Initial Evaluation of a Multidimensional Digital Stress Scale', *Psychological Assessment*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2021, pp. 230–242

5. Willingness to seek help – adaptation of the Attitudes Toward Seeking Professional Psychological Help scale.[27]

The organisational dimension should cover the following indicators:

1. Organisational culture – the Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument questionnaire[28] adapted for the uniformed services.
2. Trust in superiors – an adaptation of the organisational trust scale.[29]
3. Response procedures – expert assessment and analysis of documents relating to crisis procedures.
4. Availability of training – analysis of training programmes and evaluation of their effectiveness.

The socio-digital dimension, on the other hand, should encompass:

1. Public trust in the organisation – adaptation of institutional trust scales (e.g. the European Social Survey).
2. Monitoring of disinformation – analysis of social media content using sentiment monitoring and analysis tools.
3. Communication effectiveness – analysis of the reach and reception of the organisation's messages in the digital sphere.

Areas for further research and practical application

Further research should involve the empirical validation of the model through longitudinal and cross-sectional studies on diverse samples of officers from Polish uniformed services. These studies should take into account the operationalisation indicators presented above and test the relationships between the individual dimensions of the model. It will be particularly important to test the mediating and moderating relationships between the model's components, which will enable the identification of key protective mechanisms and critical points where systemic interventions may yield the greatest benefits.[30]

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[27] E. H. Fischer, A. Farina, 'Attitudes Toward Seeking Professional Psychological Help: A Shortened Form and Considerations for Research', J*ournal of College Student Development*, vol. 36, no. 4, 1995, pp. 368–373.

[28] K. S. Cameron, R. E. Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework*, 3rd ed., Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 2011.

[29] R. C. Mayer, J. H. Davis, F. D. Schoorman, 'An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust', *Academy of Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 3, 1995, pp. 709–734.

[30] N. Ogińska-Bulik, Pozytywne skutki doświadczeń traumatycznych, Difin, Warszawa 2013.

It is also essential to evaluate the effectiveness of specific intervention tools – training modules designed to develop cognitive resilience and digital hygiene, organisational procedures for responding to reputation attacks and disinformation campaigns, crisis communication protocols in the digital sphere, and support programmes for the families of officers exposed to hybrid pressure. In this context, it is worth referring to research on the effectiveness of resilience programmes in other countries, such as studies on the CSF2 programme in the US Army or support programmes for the police in the UK.[31]

In practical terms, the IMBOP-GD model can be used to design:

1. Integrated training programmes for officers at all career levels.
2. Crisis response procedures for hybrid and disinformation incidents.
3. Psychological support systems that take into account the specific nature of digital threats.
4. Support programmes for officers' families.
5. External communication strategies for law enforcement agencies in the age of disinformation.

Limitations of the model and directions for further development

Like any theoretical model, the IMBOP-GD model has its limitations. Firstly, it was developed primarily on the basis of a review of the literature and the experiences of Polish uniformed services – its universality requires further verification in other cultural and institutional contexts. Secondly, the model is descriptive rather than predictive in nature – the causal mechanisms and relationships between variables require further refinement. Thirdly, the practical implementation of the model may encounter cultural and organisational resistance, particularly in units with a deeply ingrained ethos of „toughness".

An analysis of potential barriers to implementation points to the following factors: (1) the hierarchical structure of the uniformed services, which may hinder the implementation of bottom-up changes; (2) a lack of the financial and human resources necessary to carry out comprehensive training and change procedures; (3) resistance to changing the organisational culture, particularly in units with a long tradition and a strong attachment to existing practices; (4) a lack of digital skills amongst management staff, which may

[31] A. F. Moreno, M. Karanika-Murray, P. Batista et al., Resilience Training Programs with Police Forces: A Systematic Review, Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, vol. 39, 2024, pp. 227–252

hinder the implementation of the socio-digital dimension; (5) the specific characteristics of individual units, which require the model to be adapted to their needs, structure and mission.

Further development of the model should include, amongst other things, the development of diagnostic tools to measure specific dimensions of resilience, the creation of training programmes tailored to specific organisations, and research into the long-term effectiveness of interventions based on the model's principles. It is particularly important to conduct longitudinal studies that will enable the assessment of the sustainability of the interventions' effects and the identification of factors moderating their effectiveness.

Conclusions

The IMBOP-GD model represents an attempt to overcome the fragmentary nature of the existing body of research through the systematic integration of three key dimensions of psychosocial resilience. Unlike existing models (such as PERMA, JD-R or CSF2), IMBOP-GD: (1) introduces the socio-digital dimension as a separate dimension, equally important to the individual and organisational dimensions; (2) integrates the three dimensions into a coherent whole, taking into account their mutual interactions; (3) takes into account the specific nature of hybrid threats, including cognitive warfare and disinformation; (4) includes officers' families as an important element of the support system.

Its implementation may contribute to increasing the effectiveness of preventive and intervention measures within the uniformed services in the face of contemporary hybrid threats. The development and implementation of an integrated model not only addresses an identified research gap but also makes a practical contribution to building the resilience of the state as a whole in the era of information and cognitive conflicts. Further empirical research is essential to verify the model and adapt it to the specific characteristics of individual uniformed services.

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Structured Abstract

Title
IMBOP-GD – An Interdisciplinary Model for Building the Psychosocial Resilience of Standby Groups in the Face of Hybrid Threats

Keywords
psychosocial resilience; standby groups; IMBOP-GD model; hybrid threats; socio-digital resilience; cognitive warfare; uniformed services

Language of Speech
English

General Purpose and Rationale Need for Topic Selection
The study aims to present the mechanisms through which individual competencies, organizational culture, and socio-digital resilience interact in shaping effectiveness, well-being, and operational readiness. The general purpose of this study is to examine members of uniformed and standby groups as subjects of psychosocial resilience research and to develop an interdisciplinary model explaining and strengthening their resilience in the face of contemporary hybrid threats.

The Main Research Problem
How can psychosocial resilience among members of uniformed and standby groups be systematically strengthened through the integration of individual, organizational, and socio-digital dimensions in the context of hybrid threats and cognitive warfare?

Research Questions

1. What limitations characterize existing resilience-building models?
2. What theoretical assumptions underlie the IMBOP-GD model?
3. How do individual competencies contribute to resilience?
4. What role does organizational culture play?
5. How can socio-digital resilience support public trust and institutional effectiveness?
6. What interactions occur between the dimensions of resilience?
7. How can the model be operationalized and implemented?

Basic Literature on the Subject of the Work

The study is based on the works of Seligman (positive psychology and well-being), Antonovsky (salutogenic theory), Hobfoll (Conservation of Resources Theory), Bakker and Demerouti (JD-R Model), Maciejewski (sociology of dispositional groups), as well as research on hybrid threats, disinformation, digital stress, and psychosocial resilience in uniformed services by Cornum, Galeotti, Chesney and Citron, and Hall et al.

Structure of the Text Subtitles

1. Introduction
2. Methodology for constructing the model
3. Theoretical assumptions of the IMBOP-GD model
4. The three dimensions of the IMBOP-GD model
5. Rationale for integrating the dimensions
6. Examples of the model's practical applicatio
7. Areas for further research and practical application
8. Limitations of the model and directions for further development
9. Conclusions

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

The IMBOP-GD model integrates individual, organizational, and socio-digital dimensions of resilience into a comprehensive framework for uniformed services. The model supports resilience against hybrid threats, disinformation, cognitive warfare, and digital stress, while strengthening psychological well-being, organizational culture, and public trust.